Rose’s Prevention Paradox by Thompson, Christopher Jeremy
	   1	  
Rose’s Prevention Paradox 
Christopher Thompson 
University of Groningen 
 




Geoffrey Rose’s ‘prevention paradox’ occurs when a population-based preventative 
health measure that brings large benefits to the community – such as compulsory 
seatbelts, a ‘fat tax’, or mass immunisation – offers little to each participating 
individual. Although the prevention paradox is not obviously a paradox in the sense in 
which philosophers understand the term, it does raise important normative questions. 
In particular, should we implement population-based preventative health measures 
when the typical individual is not expected to gain from them? After canvassing other 
attempts to address the paradox, I argue that what is significant about the prevention 
paradox is that it involves intra-personal trade-offs; the costs and benefits of the 
choice to implement or not implement a preventative health measure fall on the same 
individuals. The intra-personal nature of these trade-offs has two implications.  First, 
the solutions to the paradox proposed by other authors are deficient. Second, the 
policy choice to not implement some preventative health measures can be normatively 
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1. Introduction 
Consider a public health problem such as the number of deaths from coronary heart 
disease.1 Broadly speaking there are two strategies we might pursue for dealing with 
the problem. The first strategy is termed ‘high-risk’, and involves targeting those at 
greatest risk of the condition. For example, if we are concerned with the number of 
deaths from coronary heart disease we might focus on treating only those individuals 
with the highest serum cholesterol levels, and the treatment might involve prescribing 
statins. The second strategy is termed a ‘population’ or ‘mass’ strategy, and involves 
treating a much wider group of individuals, up to and including the entire population. 
For example, if we are concerned with the number of deaths from coronary heart 
disease we might introduce a tax on fatty foods.2 
 
The population strategy is likely to save more lives than the high-risk strategy. Why is 
this so? The epidemiologist Geoffrey Rose claimed that it is a fundamental axiom or 
principle of preventative medicine that “A large number of people exposed to a low 
risk is likely to produce more cases than a small number of people exposed to a high 
risk.”3 The expected number of lives saved under each strategy is simply the decrease 
in the chance of death, multiplied by the number of people affected. In our example of 
coronary heart disease, the high-risk strategy leads to a large drop in the likelihood of 
death, but it applies to a relatively small number of people. By contrast the population 
strategy generates a slight reduction in the likelihood of death, but it applies to a large 
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However, we now face what Rose calls the ‘prevention paradox’: 
 
“…a preventative measure that brings large benefits to the community offers 
little to each participating individual.” 4 
 
For example, suppose we were to introduce a fat tax to reduce deaths from coronary 
heart disease (an example of a population strategy), and evidence from 
epidemiological studies suggests the associated reduction in consumption of fatty 
foods would prevent 1 in 50 heart attacks. While the total number of lives saved by 
this policy may be significant, it means that 49 out of every 50 people at risk of a 
heart attack – those targeted by the policy - change their diets for a lifetime and see no 
gain.5 In addition, such a policy means that many others in the population not at risk 
of a heart attack also change their diets and see no benefit (setting aside coincidental 
benefits, such as an improved physique).  
 
The prevention paradox, as described by Rose, is not obviously a paradox in the sense 
in which philosophers understand the term – that is, as a set of apparently true but 
jointly inconsistent propositions. And the question of what will or will not motivate 
individuals to participate in preventative health measures is, ultimately, an empirical 
matter. But the prevention paradox does seem to raise important normative questions, 
in particular in distributive justice as applied to health care.  
 
In what follows I follow Stephen John’s6 distinction between the ‘absolute’ and 
‘relative’ versions of the problem. In the absolute version of the prevention paradox 
the targets of the population strategy do not see the treatment as being worth their 
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while, they do not want to participate, and we face a choice between implementing 
the population strategy or not.7 In the relative version of the prevention paradox, the 
targets of the population strategy do see the population treatment as being worth their 
while, and are happy to participate. However, in the relative version, we face a choice 
between implementing the population strategy or implementing a different high-risk 
strategy (by stipulation, cost or other factors mean we cannot implement both).8 In 
this paper I focus on the absolute version of the prevention paradox, and the correct 
normative response to it: should we implement population-based preventative health 
measures when the typical individual is not expected to gain from them and would 
prefer not to be subjected to them?9 For reasons that will become clear, the normative 
approach I propose for the absolute version of the prevention paradox does not work 
for the relative version of the prevention paradox, since the normatively significant 
features of the absolute and relative versions of the paradox are quite different.  
 
2. Geoffrey Rose’s and Stephen John’s solutions 
The prevention paradox poses a dilemma. As Rose himself says: “It is a common 
irony of preventative medicine that many people must take precautions in order to 
prevent illness in only a few.”10; “There can be a conflict here between the collective 
interest, which requires community-wide change, and that of many of the individuals 
concerned, who could well consider that their prospect of benefit was negligible.”11 It 
seems clear that Rose himself thought that population strategies should be 
implemented, in spite of the fact that they are to the expected disadvantage of all 
concerned: “Potentially far more effective [than the strategy targeted at high-risk 
individuals], and ultimately the only acceptable answer, is the mass strategy, whose 
aim is to shift the whole population’s distribution of the risk variable.”12; “Finally, the 
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conclusion will be that preventative medicine must embrace both [the high-risk and 
population strategies], but, of the two, power resides with the population strategy.”13  
 
The first attempt to address the prevention paradox from a philosophical (as opposed 
to medical) perspective, that I am aware of, comes from Stephen John.14 John does 
attempt to frame Rose’s problem as a paradox. John argues that the paradoxical nature 
of the prevention paradox rests on a fallacy of equivocation: the notion of ‘benefit’ is 
used in two slightly different ways. The prevention paradox arises since the same 
policy simultaneously harms everyone and benefits some people. From the 
perspective of individuals, the population strategy does more harm than good, since 
the costs of the treatment (the decreased consumption of delicious, fatty foods) are 
greater than the benefits (the decreased chance of dying). From a group level 
perspective, the population strategy does more good than harm since the lives saved 
seem worth the sum of the inconvenience from changed diets. The claim that each 
individual is harmed by the policy rests on an interpretation of ‘benefit’ as ex ante 
expected utility. The claim that some individuals are benefited by the policy relies on 
an interpretation of the ‘benefit’ as the ex post outcomes. The resolution of the 
prevention paradox, then, rests on which notion of benefit is primary. And which 
notion of benefit is primary determines the correct normative analysis of the absolute 
version of the prevention paradox: should we implement the population-based 
preventative measures, or not? 
 
Stephen John posits ex ante contractualism as one normative framework that policy-
makers could apply to the prevention paradox. According to contractualism, “An 
individual can reasonably reject a principle (or set of principles) if and only if she can 
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give some reason against their adoption and propose an alternative (set of) 
principle(s), such that no-one else has a stronger objection against her proposal than 
she has against the original.”15 According to John’s ex ante version of contractualism, 
these complaints are to be assessed according to the ex ante prospects facing 
individuals, rather than the ex post outcomes of the policy choice. From the ex ante 
perspective, each individual subject to the population strategy has a complaint against 
implementing the policy, since it does them more expected harm than expected good. 
From the ex ante perspective, no one has a complaint against failing to implement the 
policy (any complaints against failing to implement the policy come from the ex post 
outcome perspective of those who will die). Ex ante contractualism is the preferred 
normative framework for two reasons. First, ex ante contractualism gives normative 
prescriptions that are in line with common intuitions; many individuals and policy 
makers share the intuition that the population strategy should not be implemented, and 
ex ante contractualism provides normative backing for this intuition.16 Second, ex 
ante contractualism can accommodate the complaints of those in the population group 
who are asked to make the sacrifice of changing their diet for the sake of others, and 
can do so without suggesting that somehow the aggregate disutility of all those who 
have to change their diets is comparable to, and outweighs, the loss of life.  
 
3. Intra-personal trade-offs 
Both Rose and John seem to have overlooked an important feature of the prevention 
paradox, which ought to inform the correct normative response: there is no (direct) 
causal link between one person changing their diet and another person’s life being 
saved.17 Changing your diet reduces the risk of death for you; changing your diet does 
not reduce the risk of death for anyone else. Any variation in the probability of your 
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death from heart disease, that arises from changing or not changing your diet, is 
independent of the probability of death from heart disease for all other individuals. As 
a consequence, the decision to comply with the population strategy is not really an 
altruistic act, since compliance does not benefit other individuals. Instead, the 
absolute version of the prevention paradox involves trade-offs between two different 
potential future versions of the same individual.  
 
There is a further reason why the features of the population strategy involve intra-
personal comparisons. The outcomes of individuals are independent, conditional on 
any common causes including participation or non-participation in the population 
strategy. The ex post harms experienced by some individuals (the instances of heart 
disease) are not necessary for the ex post gains experienced by other individuals (the 
avoidance of heart disease).18 Moreover, it is not the case that one individual avoiding 
heart disease comes at the expense of another individual who suffers heart disease. It 
is not as if there are a finite number of instances of avoiding heart disease that 
individuals compete for; it is entirely possible (if extremely unlikely) for all 
individuals to avoid heart disease.  
 
Given that the absolute version of the prevention paradox involves intra-personal 
tradeoffs, how does this affect the correct normative response? Michael Otsuka and 
Alex Voorhoeve 19  cite survey evidence that individuals are indifferent to the 
distribution of costs and benefits when it comes to intra-personal trade-offs; 
individuals apply what appears to be a ‘utilitarian’ normative framework, they 
maximise expected utility.20 For example, people are indifferent between a treatment 
that would entirely cure their slight impairment, and treatment that would turn their 
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very severe impairment into a somewhat less severe impairment, given a 50/50 
antecedent risk of having either condition. As Otsuka and Voorhoeve point out, if you 
are a morally motivated stranger who has to decide which treatment to apply to some 
person, then it seems appropriate to respect the preferences of this person and act so 
as to maximise their expected utility.21 
 
The permissibility of maximising expected utility in intra-personal trade-offs, but not 
inter-personal trade-offs, depends on the moral unity and separateness of persons. As 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve state, “…a single person has a unity that renders it permissible 
to balance (expected) benefits and burdens against each other that might accrue to her. 
A group of people, by contrast, does not possess such unity. As a consequence, some 
forms of balancing benefits and burdens that are permitted when these accrue to a 
single person are impermissible in cases where these benefits and burdens accrue to 
different people.”22  
 
In the standard examples of the absolute version of the prevention paradox, the 
individuals subject to the population-based preventative strategy are autonomous 
adults, capable of well-informed and rational preferences. Moreover, the standard 
examples involve matters of public health policy over which the individuals ought to 
have a say. If it is permissible to maximise expected utility in cases of intra-personal 
trade-offs, then a respect for the autonomy of those involved requires not 
implementing the preventative strategy. 
 
Suppose we were to implement a fat tax as a population strategy aimed at reducing 
the incidence of heart disease. It is possible to implement this policy with certain 
	   9	  
exemptions; the default may be a blanket percentage tax applied to certain categories 
of food, but certain individuals could be excluded from the tax, either by having the 
tax removed from their bill at the till point, or by claiming the tax back as part of their 
annual tax return. If a given individual wanted to be exempt from the fat tax, then 
what grounds are there for refusing this? Their exemption might impact on their own 
future health (if they now buy and consume more unhealthy food, and consequently 
develop heart disease), but their exemption from the fat tax does not harm the health 
of anyone else. And it is not as if they are free-riding on anyone else’s compliance 
with the fat-tax – they do not directly or obviously benefit if others change their diets. 
To refuse an individual’s request to be exempt from a fat tax would entail a violation 
of that individual’s autonomy. All those who would be subject to the fat tax would 
want such an exemption, since by stipulation no-one believes such a tax is in their ex 
ante interests. So implementing the population strategy in an autonomy-respecting 
manner means that no individual would be subject to the fat tax.  
 
Not all policies for implementing the population strategy will allow for such 
exemptions. For example, suppose that the most effective population strategy for 
reducing the incidence of cardiovascular disease is to force people to take more 
exercise by changing the physical infrastructure of a city. So elevators will be 
removed to encourage people to take the stairs, and parking spaces will be removed to 
make way for cycle lanes.23 Here we ought to take on board the lesson from instances 
in which it is possible to implement preventative strategies in an autonomy-respecting 
manner. If, when given the opportunity to do so, all would opt out of the population 
strategy then ought not to force compliance.  
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The population strategy represents a case of intra-personal (rather than inter-personal) 
trade-offs: changing your diet now means you reduce your risk of heart attack in the 
future; not changing your diet now means you run an increased risk of heart attack in 
the future. Therefore, contrary to what Rose suggests, the precautions of the many do 
not prevent illness in a few; there is no conflict between the collective and individual 
interests, since the costs and benefits of deciding to forego a preventative treatment 
arise in two potential futures of the same individual.  
 
Furthermore, the normative framework advanced by John, ex-ante contractualism, 
seems to be an overly complicated response to the absolute version of the prevention 
paradox. Contractualism requires that we choose the policy that is most acceptable to 
the individual with the strongest complaints. With the absolute version of the 
prevention paradox, we have three sources of potential complaints: the ex ante 
complaints against implementing the population treatment from those who would 
rather accept the risk of heart disease and not pay a fat tax or change their diets, the ex 
post complaints against implementing the population treatment from those who pay a 
fat tax or change their diets but for whom this does not benefit, and the ex post 
complaints in favour of implementing the population treatment from those whose life 
might be saved by a fat tax and change in diet. Why ignore the last two - ex post - 
sources of complaints? John24 argues against actual harm (ex post) contractualism on 
the grounds that it gives normative prescriptions contrary to the common moral 
intuition that the population strategy should not be implemented; according to ex post 
contractualism, the complaints of those who will die if we do not implement the 
population treatment are stronger than the complaints of those who are 
inconvenienced by the population treatment. According to ex post contractualism we 
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ought to implement the population-based preventative strategy of introducing a fat 
tax.25 
 
But if we acknowledge that the absolute version of the prevention paradox involves 
intra-personal trade-offs, then we need not choose between the moral intuitions and 
the normative theory, and we need not rule out ex post claims and ex post (actual 
harm) contractualism by stipulation. Rather, because we are dealing with intra-
personal comparisons, it is the individual agents themselves that choose to privilege 
their ex ante prospects over their own ex post outcomes.  
 
The absolute version of the prevention paradox involves intra-personal trade-offs, and 
as such it is permissible to maximise individuals’ expected utility. In examples, such 
as a proposal to introduce a fat tax to encourage healthy eating and thereby avoid 
deaths from coronary heart disease, it is correct to refuse to implement the policy on 
the basis that the costs outweigh the benefits, even if this policy decision will lead to a 
loss of life, since the costs and benefits fall on different possible futures of the same 
individuals. In a sense, the fact that the absolute version of the prevention paradox 
involves purely intra-personal trade-offs means that it is not really an issue of 
distributive justice at all. The only normative principle we need to appeal to, to justify 
not interfering in a purely private matter, is a concern for personal autonomy. 
 
4. Resisting inter-personal comparisons 
The normative account I have provided for the absolute version of the prevention 
paradox depends crucially on the claim that only intra-personal comparisons are 
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relevant in such cases. Let me now present and address a number of possible 
objections to this claim.  
 
First, a policy of not implementing the population strategy is ex ante Pareto efficient, 
that is to say, not implementing the population strategy maximises the expected utility 
for every person, and it would be impossible to improve the situation for one 
individual without making at least one other individual worse-off. This fact seems to 
count in favour of not implementing the population strategy. However, the ex post 
costs and benefits of not implementing the population strategy fall on different 
individuals; from the ex post perspective there are clear winners and losers from the 
policy (those who did not change their diets and are still alive vs. those who die from 
heart disease). The fact that there are ex post winners and losers from the decision to 
implement or not implement the population strategy suggests that, contrary to my core 
claim in this paper, the absolute version of the prevention paradox does not only 
involve intra-personal trade-offs. There are three related arguments against ex ante 
Pareto reasoning that must be addressed. The first of these arguments comes from 
Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, the second from Thomas Scanlon, and the third 
from Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey.   
 
The permissibility of maximising expected utility in cases comprising intra-personal 
trade-offs was supported above by analysis from Michael Otsuka and Alex 
Voorhoeve.26 But Otuska and Voorhoeve explicitly reject the application of this 
analysis to cases involving ex post inequality. They argue that focusing exclusively on 
the ex ante prospects of individuals, and the prudential argument27 for maximising 
each individual’s expected utility, ignores the claims of individuals who end up ex 
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post badly off and worse off than others due to bad brute luck. Otsuka and Voorhoeve 
note that one way28 of accounting for concerns with ex post inequality is that “…one 
must justify any claim on resources in light of the comparative strength of the claims 
of others.” (p.183) The claims of the worst-off in a possible world in which we do not 
implement a fat tax (those who die from heart disease) are stronger than the claims of 
the worst-off in a possible world in which we do implement a fat tax (those who are 
frustrated by a fat tax). How, then, can we justify the policy of not implementing the 
fat tax to those individuals who will die from heart disease? 
  
There is reason to think that the ex post inequality in absolute version of the 
prevention paradox might be justifiable to those who end up worst-off. If someone 
ends up ex post in a worse position than others, then this is the direct result of an 
attempt to benefit that individual by maximising their expected utility. As Fleurbaey 
and Voorhoeve29 note, “On the distributive view [of equal chances], a given outcome 
inequality among people with equally strong claims to a benefit is less unfair when 
each person has a chance to end up better off than when the worse off have no such 
chance, because in receiving this chance, each person receives an equal share of 
something of expected value.” (p.123) Depending on how much weight we give to the 
ex post inequalities as opposed to the ex ante chances “…the fact that the equal 
chances offered by [an ex ante Pareto improving policy] mitigate the associated 
outcome-unfairness may tip the balance in its favor.” (p.125) So now we need a 
reason to give weight to the ex ante chances rather than the ex post inequalities. In the 
absolute version of the prevention paradox there is such a reason for giving extra 
weight to the prudential concerns, namely a concern for individuals’ autonomy.30 The 
individuals involved in the absolute version of the prevention paradox themselves 
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weigh the ex ante prospects more highly than the ex post outcomes, and so we ought 
to respect this evaluation.31  And given that all individuals value their ex ante 
prospects over their ex post outcomes, it is not clear that any ex post inequalities that 
arise from maximising their expected utility give them any grounds for complaints. 
 
Thomas Scanlon32 presents an argument against ex ante Pareto reasoning as part of a 
defence of contractualism. Scanlon argues that what is reasonable for an individual to 
accept is not the same thing as what is rational for an individual to accept. For 
Scanlon, an individual is bound to accept a principle if this individual judges that they 
cannot reasonably reject the principle, no matter what position they occupy in society. 
It may well be the case that every individual would rationally choose a principle of 
maximising expected utility behind a veil of ignorance, that is to say, if you did not 
know what position in society you occupied and assumed you had equal chance of 
filling any of these positions. The reason the ex ante rationality does not amount to 
reasonableness is that – ex post – there may well be some losers. If the position of 
these losers were significantly bad, they would have complaint against the policy. 
Applied to the prevention paradox, Scanlon’s argument suggests that we should 
implement the preventative strategy in spite of protests. It may well be the case that 
perfectly rational people would not want to have their diets changed to reduce their 
risk of death from heart disease. However, the individuals who will go on to die from 
heart disease can reasonably reject the policy of refusing to implement the 
preventative strategy, given how bad their situation is. 
 
Frances Kamm provides the best response to Scanlon’s argument. As Kamm notes, 
“…even Scanlon can accept oftentimes an individual’s actual (rather than 
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hypothetical) choice to take a risk of falling into a disfavored position does undermine 
his complaint if he loses; such a choice can be a substitute for considering his 
perspective simply as a person in a disfavored position. Scanlon would have to 
explain either why hypothetical choice is different or in which circumstances risks are 
acceptable and in which not.”33 Kamm notes that individuals often accept a small risk 
of death for the sake of a small gain. She cites Allan Gibbard’s example of risking 
death in a car accident in order to purchase a chocolate bar; such a person would have 
no complaint if they were to die in a car accident. The question, then, is what such 
general willingness to take small risks means for hypothetical choices.  
 
By stipulation, the agents involved in the prevention paradox cases prefer to not 
implement the policy since not implementing the policy maximises their expected 
utility. Given a choice, the individuals would be willing to take the risk and would not 
want the population strategy implemented. Policy makers can justify not 
implementing the population-based preventative health strategies since, not only is it 
in the prudential interests of the individual agents themselves, it is relevantly similar 
to the small risks they take every day, and is precisely what the individuals would 
have chosen for themselves of they were given the opportunity to choose. This 
prudential justification provides a response to any complaint presented by an agent 
who ends up as an ex post loser. 
 
Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve34 provide a different but related argument 
against implementing policies on the basis of the policies’ ex ante Pareto efficiency. 
They argue that choosing a policy based on ex ante Pareto efficiency conflicts with a 
requirement of rationality, namely, that if you can infer that you would invariably 
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regard an alternative as best, given full information, then you should choose this 
alternative. With the prevention paradox, we know that there will be some people who 
will be harmed as a result of the decision to not implement the population strategy – 
there will be avoidable deaths from heart disease. Although we don't know who these 
individuals are ex ante, we would know exactly who these individuals are with the 
full information provided by the ex post perspective. Given this full information – 
given knowledge of precisely who will die if we fail to implement the population 
strategy – a failure to implement the strategy would seem wrong, since it could not be 
justified to those who will die as a result of the policy decision. If we know now that 
we would invariably choose to implement the population policy, given full 
information, then we ought to implement the policy. 
 
Johann Frick 35 , in a response piece to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, argues that 
uncertainty – ex ante ignorance as to who will be the ex post winners and losers – can 
affect the normative ranking of policy alternatives, and so what you should choose in 
conditions of uncertainty is different to what you should choose under conditions of 
certainty. Ex ante it is impossible to know who will win and who will lose from a 
decision to implement or not implement the population strategy; what decision 
makers would decide, conditional on knowledge of who the ex post losers are is 
beside the point, since the antecedent of this conditional is never satisfied. Moreover, 
the individuals who would be subject to a decision to implement or not implement the 
population strategy would not want the decision maker to have the information as to 
who the ex post losers are, since this harms their ex ante interests by preventing them 
from maximising their expected utility. In combination these factors may well make a 
decision to not implement the population strategy justifiable to the ex post losers.  
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Let’s put to one side the concerns with ex ante Pareto reasoning and consider a second 
reason why inter-personal comparisons might be relevant in the absolute version of 
the prevention paradox. It was argued above that the intra-personal comparisons, 
constitutive of the absolute version of the prevention paradox, arise because of the 
independence of individuals. The change in one individual’s risk of death given their 
(non)involvement in the preventative strategy is independent of all other individuals’ 
risks of death, and the final outcomes of individuals are independent conditional on 
any common causal factors, including the choice over whether to implement the 
prevention strategy. There is, however, one important factor that does generate 
dependence between agents, namely the policy decision concerning whether or not to 
implement an exemption-free population strategy. It follows that one individual’s 
willingness to support the implementation of a population strategy (perhaps by voting 
for such a strategy), can affect other’s outcomes and so does involve at least some 
inter-personal comparisons. If you support the implementation of the population 
strategy, then someone else’s life may be saved. But there is reason to resist this line 
of argument, and the associated inter-personal comparisons. Those who would benefit 
from the population strategy, and your support for it, do not want the strategy 
implemented. This is shown by the fact that they would opt out of the strategy if given 
the opportunity to do so. Respect for their autonomy requires not forcing the 
population strategy on them.  
 
There is a third sense in which the prevention paradox is not purely a case of intra-
personal trade-offs. There is a weak sense in which the actions of those participating 
in the population strategy do benefit other people – the behavior of the high-risk 
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people varies with the norm.36 If it becomes normal for the wider population to 
consume less fat in their diet, then the high-risk people may also change their diet 
slightly and receive the associated health benefits. As such, we might again argue that 
those in the population group should be willing to change their diet since doing so 
might help those who are at high-risk of death from coronary heart disease. But even 
if we can draw a causal connection between the actions of those in the population 
group and the effects on those at high-risk, the connection seems tenuous. It seems to 
ask too much that I change my diet for a lifetime on the basis that this might help 
those at highest risk by sending a social signal. This is particularly so if there are 
policy alternatives for reducing the risks of the high-risk individuals that do not 
require sacrifice on the part of low-risk individuals (prescribing statins to the high-
risk individuals, for example). We also face a ‘many hands problem’. A sizeable 
proportion of the wider population may need to change their diets so as to influence 
the behavior of high-risk individuals who vary with the norm. But there is no reason 
why I, in particular, need to be part of this social movement.   
 
Finally, there may be a concern that the intra-personal trade-offs are a feature of the 
particular example of improving diets by placing a tax on fatty foods, rather than a 
feature of the absolute version of the prevention paradox per se. Suppose that we are 
still concerned with the number of deaths from heart disease, but that a leading cause 
of heart disease is viral infection (myocarditis). The particular policy proposal to 
reduce the incidence of heart disease is widespread vaccination. Although individuals 
may benefit themselves from being immunised, their decision to be immunised 
contributes to herd immunity and so is in part an altruistic act. This is particularly so 
as there will be some individuals who are not able to become immune themselves and 
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so rely on the herd immunity. Here it seems that the prevention paradox is not purely 
a case of intra-personal trade-offs. 
 
There are two possible responses to this line of argument. The first is to acknowledge 
the strength of the argument, and to consider cases in which one individual’s 
participation in a population strategy does benefit another to be exceptions to the 
analysis I advance in this paper.37 An alternative response is to note that, by 
stipulation, the prevention paradox involves a case in which no individual wants to 
participate in the population strategy. Individuals have considered the disutility of 
participating in the population strategy, and risks of death given the choice not to 
participate. Individuals have come to the conclusion that their expected utility is 
maximised by the choice not to participate. If individuals are unwilling to take steps 
to reduce their own risks of heart disease by accepting immunisation (given that they 
are unaware they will rely on herd immunity), then they lack grounds for complaint if 
herd immunity is not available when they need it.   
 
5. The scope of the analysis 
The prevention paradox arises whenever a population-based preventive health 
measure is to individuals’ ex ante disadvantage, but has ex post advantages at the 
population level. The absolute version of the prevention paradox occurs whenever 
there is a consensus among the individuals affected that they do not want to 
participate in the measure. Possible examples might include a fat tax, or the 
widespread prescription of statins aimed at reducing heart disease; compulsory cycle 
helmets, or compulsory seatbelts aimed at reducing road deaths; and a ban on 
smoking in private cars carrying no passengers, or an increase in tobacco tax (beyond 
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what is required to recoup the additional public health costs generated by smokers) 
aimed at reducing lung cancer. All these examples have two features in common. 
First, an individual’s involvement or non-involvement in the measure only affects 
their own health. Second, the individuals concerned are autonomous adults, capable 
of well-informed and rational preferences. Given that only intra-personal trade-offs 
are at stake, and given a respect for individual’s autonomy, we ought not implement 
these population strategies. 
 
Excluded from this analysis are cases where the actions of one individual do impact 
on another. So it may be justifiable to introduce a ban on smoking in public places, or 
a ban on cell phone use when driving, since smoking in public or driving while using 
a cell phone imposes risks on others.  
 
Also excluded from this analysis are cases involving children, since they are 
incapable of autonomous decisions. For example, suppose widespread take-up of the 
HPV vaccine in girls would lead to a reduction in the incidence of cervical cancer in 
later life from 7/100,000 to 5/100,000, and would therefore reduce ex post inequality. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that being vaccinated is only marginally to an 
individual’s ex ante disadvantage (although the disutility of cervical cancer is high, 
the probability is low, and being vaccinated is painful). In this example, the prudential 
argument against implementing the population strategy opposes the egalitarian 
argument in favour of implementation, but there are no concerns for autonomy to tip 
the balance in favour of the prudential argument. My own intuitions in this particular 
case, for what they are worth, are that here the egalitarian concerns are more 
important than the prudential concerns. The lesson may be that in cases such as this 
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the details matter – if a policy is ex ante extremely disadvantageous this may trump a 
small gain in ex post equality; but if a policy is ex ante only slightly to an individual’s 
disadvantage then this might be trumped by significant gains in ex post equality.  
 
Now consider a case in which the government uses a public resource (e.g. state oil 
reserves) to subsidise statins for all (so that all are interested in taking them) even 
though everyone would rather have the cash in hand and no subsidised statins.38 I 
presume that in this example the individuals affected are autonomous adults, but 
including a new alternative in an individual’s option set, which the individual now 
prefers, does not violate their autonomy. There might, however, be an objection to 
this policy in the sense that a government is supposed to act as an agent of the 
individuals affected by its decisions. This seems like an example of a policy choice 
that the adults, as citizens in a democracy, have a right to make. If the voters don't 
want a public resource to be wasted on subsidising statins, then the government ought 
to respect that. In a modified case in which a drug company itself decides to cross-
subsidise statins (so that all are interested in taking them), there is no objection at all: 
it is to the ex ante advantage of all, it reduces ex post inequalities, there are no 
autonomy violations, and it is irrelevant if the individuals would prefer different drugs 
to be subsidised (or would prefer cash in hand from the drug company), since the drug 
company is not acting as an agent of the individuals concerned and the individuals 
have no right to any subsidy at all from the drug company. 
 
A final important caveat with the normative account I have provided for the 
prevention paradox is that even if surveys indicate that people are happy to be 
utilitarian with regard to intra-personal trade-offs, we still might want to give some 
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extra weight to those possible future versions of people that are worst-off. We might 
argue that individuals are error-prone when it comes to calculating expected utility, 
for example, that people cannot properly comprehend the disutility from dying of a 
heart attack. As such, even if individuals are indifferent to the distribution of expected 
utility across different possible future versions of themselves, we might need to place 
extra weight on the possible future versions that are worst-off. Nevertheless, even if 
some weight is applied to the possible future versions of individuals that are worst-
off, this weighting will not necessarily be total. In contrast to inter-personal cases, it 
seems perfectly permissible in intra-personal cases to compare and trade-off the 
inconvenience of changing your diet against saving your life, and this is permissible 
precisely because the costs and benefits arise in two possible futures of the same 
individual.39 
 
6. Closing remarks  
In this paper I focus on the absolute version of the prevention paradox, where agents 
prefer that a population-wide preventative health strategy is not implemented, since 
the expected costs of the strategy outweigh the expected benefits. The core argument I 
make in this paper is that the correct normative response to this policy choice rests on 
recognising that instances of the absolute version of the prevention paradox involve 
intra-personal trade-offs. The costs and benefits of a decision to implement or not 
implement the population strategy arise in two possible futures of the same individual, 
and as such, it is permissible to maximise each individual’s expected utility and not 
implement the policy. This normative prescription differs from that given by Rose 
himself, who suggested that population-wide preventative health strategies ought to 
be implemented. The normative prescription I advance for absolute version of the 
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prevention paradox is, however, the same as the prescription given by John’s ex ante 
contractualism, albeit for different reasons. In closing I argue that acknowledging the 
fact that intra-personal trade-offs are the key to the correct normative response to the 
absolute version of the prevention paradox, helps explain why ex ante contractualism 
does not work so well for the relative version of the prevention paradox.  
 
Recall that in the relative version of the prevention paradox, the targets of the 
population strategy do see the population treatment as being worth their while, and 
are happy to participate. However, in the relative version, we face a choice between 
implementing the population strategy and implementing the high-risk strategy (by 
stipulation, cost or other factors mean we cannot implement both). For example, we 
might face a choice between providing a low dosage of statins to all those at slight 
risk of heart disease, or providing a higher dosage of statins to only those individuals 
with the highest serum cholesterol levels. Ex ante contractualism implies that in the 
relative version of the prevention paradox we ought to implement the high-risk rather 
than the population strategy. From the ex ante perspective, an individual in the high-
risk group has a stronger claim to assistance than any individual in the population 
group, since those in the high-risk group have a greater chance of death from heart 
disease than those in the population group. As John notes, this normative prescription 
is consistent with the intuitions of many members of the public, and policy 
professionals.  
 
J. Paul Kelleher40, writing in isolation of John, argues to the contrary, that in the types 
of cases characterised by the relative version of the prevention paradox, the fact that 
population strategies work by reducing many individual’s small risk even further does 
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not weaken the case for population strategies. If we can implement a population 
strategy or high-risk strategy, but not both, we ought to implement the population 
strategy. Kelleher’s arguments would seem to support Rose’s own apparent view that 
the population strategy is preferred over the high-risk strategy. My focus here though 
is not the correct normative account for relative version of the prevention paradox, but 
rather some difficulties that arise when ex ante contractualism is applied to the 
relative version.  
 
John41 notes that there are some types of relative prevention paradox cases where ex 
ante contractualism seems to give the wrong normative prescription. These cases are 
where there is a large difference in the risks faced by the population and high-risk 
groups, as well as a large difference in the number of lives that might be saved. To 
use John’s own numbers, suppose there are 100,000 people at a 0.5 risk of death and 
100 million people at a 0.01 risk of death; if we implement the high-risk strategy we 
save the lives of 50,000 people but if we implement the population strategy we save 
the lives of 1 million people. Ex ante contractualism requires that we implement the 
high-risk strategy, and save 50,000 lives, since any given member of the high-risk 
group is at a much higher ex ante risk of death from heart attack than any given 
member from the population group. But this prescription may seem deeply 
counterintuitive, given that it entails the avoidable deaths of 1 million other 
individuals.  
 
I suggest that the explanation for why ex ante contractualism gives the wrong answer 
in some instances of the relative version of the prevention paradox is that where a 
policy choice is genuinely competitive between different individuals, and we are 
	   25	  
forced to make inter-personal trade-offs, the ex post outcomes can have normative 
significance. It seems that what is driving the intuition that we ought to implement the 
population rather than the high-risk strategy in these cases is the sheer number of lives 
at stake. We ought to consider the ex post complaints of those who will actually die 
from heart disease, and not merely focus on the ex ante risks that individuals face. 
Addressing this point in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. But I suggest that the 
intra-personal comparisons are distinctive to the absolute version of the prevention 
paradox. These intra-personal comparisons privilege ex ante prospects over ex post 
outcomes in the absolute version of the prevention paradox. But applying the 
normative solution from the absolute version of the prevention paradox to the relative 
version gives a misleading steer, since the relative version of the prevention paradox 
involves inter-personal comparisons.42 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Other relevant public health problems could be the incidence of smoking, obesity, tooth decay, or 
deaths from air pollution. 
2 Alternatively, we might prescribe statins to a much wider group. 
3 Geoffrey Rose, ‘Strategy of prevention: lessons from cardiovascular disease.’, British Medical 
Journal, 282 (1981): 1847-1851. P.1849. 
4 Geoffrey Rose, Kay-Tee Khaw and Michael Marmot Rose’s Strategy of Preventive Medicine. (New 
York: Oxford University Press 2008). P.48. 
5 Rose, 1981, op. cit. 
6 Stephen John, ‘Risk, Contractualism, and Rose’s “Prevention Paradox”.’, Social Theory and Practice, 
40,1 (2014): 28-50. 
7 I assume throughout this paper that policy makers are aware of the preference - which all individuals 
share – for not implementing the population strategy. 
8 Obviously the clean distinction between absolute and relative versions of the prevention paradox is 
artificial. In many real-world cases, different individuals will respond differently to the same level of 
risk; some will want to implement the preventative strategy, and others will not. However, this 
abstraction is characteristic of the literature, and helps in addressing the normative points. 
9 I do not address the correct resolution of the ‘paradox’, since the prevention paradox is not really a 
paradox in the true sense of the term.  
10 Rose, 2008, op. cit., p.48. 
11 Rose, 2008, op. cit., p.61. 
12 Rose, 1981, op. cit., p.1851. 
13 Rose, 2008, op. cit., p.50. 
14 John 2011, op. cit. See also Stephen John, ‘Why the Prevention Paradox is a paradox, and why we 
should solve it: A philosophical view.’, Preventative Medicine, 53 (2011): 250-252. 
15 John, 2014, op. cit., p.32. 
	   26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See John, 2014, op. cit., p.31. 
17 Rose suggested that population-based preventative health strategies can help those at high-risk, by 
shifting the entire distribution of risk in the wider population: the behavior of high-risk individuals may 
shift with the population norm. I address this issue later in the paper.  
18 By analogy, if these were ‘trolley’ cases, we are faced with a ‘switch’ type of trolley case, rather than 
a ‘bridge’ type trolley case. See Judith Jarvis Thomson ‘The Trolley Problem.’, Yale Law Journal 94 
(1985): 1395-1415, and related literature.  	  
19 Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Why it matters that some are worse off than others.’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37, 2, (2009): 172-199. 
20 Their paper, as a whole, presents arguments against prioritarianism. Prioritarianism, so they argue, 
cannot accommodate the intuition that maximising expected utility is permissible in cases of intra-
personal trade-offs. Note that on Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s view the permissibility of maximising 
expected utility in intrapersonal trade-offs requires that we can consider persons in isolation from how 
others fare.  
21 Note that the same survey evidence suggests that people’s intuitions shift when the costs and benefits 
of a treatment strategy fall on different people. Here, intuitions suggest that we should give precedence 
to those who are worst-off. For example, if there is a choice between funding treatment to entirely cure 
a slight impairment in one person, or a treatment to turn a very severe impairment into a less severe 
impairment in an entirely different person, then the latter treatment is to be preferred. 
22 Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2009, op. cit., p.179. 
23 Suppose also, for the sake of argument, that the sorts of accommodations made available for people 
with genuine physical disabilities, such as stair lifts, are not suitable for individuals who just do not 
want to take exercise. 
24 John, 2014, op. cit.  
25 And if we consider all three sources of complaints via contractualism simpliciter (rather than ex-
ante- or ex-post contractualism), and we treat these complaints as arising from different individuals, 
then it seems, prima facie, as if we ought to implement the population-based preventative strategy since 
those who will die if we don’t implement the strategy seem to have the strongest complaints. 
26 Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2009, op. cit. 
27 This type of prudential argument is originally presented in Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2009, op. cit., and 
expanded on in Michael Otuska, 'Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons.', Utilitas 24 (2012): 
365-80. 
28 They also note that egalitarian concerns might be accounted for by the thought that inequality 
between persons is intrinsically bad. But, as they point out, this interpretation of egalitarianism is 
subject to Derek Parfit’s ‘leveling down’ objection.  
29 Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument 
against et ante Pareto.’, in Eyal, N, Hurst, S, Norheim, O, and Wikler, D, eds. Inequalities in Health: 
Concepts, Measures, and Ethics. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 115-128. 
30 This reason of autonomy is absent in the cases presented in Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, and this 
helps explain why Otuska and Voorhoeve’s view is different from the one I advance in this paper. They 
state clearly that their arguments against prioritarianism and in favour of egalitarianism go through 
even when the individuals concerned are children, incapable of forming autonomous preferences, and 
where the person who has to decide what treatment to provide is not acting as agent of those facing 
impairment (e.g. the agent is not the doctor of an individual facing impairment). In the examples 
addressed by Otsuka and Voorhoeve, where prudential concerns are opposed by egalitarian concerns, 
and the issues of autonomy are irrelevant, they argue that the concern for ex post equality is decisive. 
While issue of autonomy might be a distraction for the analysis of Otsuka and Voorhoeve (and their 
critique of prioritarianism), autonomy is a ‘feature’ not a ‘bug’ of absolute versions of the prevention 
paradox. Relatedly, the arguments Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve advance against ex ante Pareto 
reasoning specifically assume that the agents affected by the policy decision are children. This is “…in 
order to eliminate the consideration that a morally-motivated stranger has reason to do what will 
maximize the expected utility of each out of respect for their autonomy. (One might argue that a 
respect for autonomy would require such expected utility-maximization if one assumed preference-
based measure of utility of the kind elaborated [in that paper].)” See Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 2014, 
op. cit., footnote 5. 
31 It bears emphasis that in the absolute version of the prevention paradox there is - by stipulation - a 
consensus against implementing the population strategy. If some were in favour of implementing the 
population strategy, and some against, then inter-personal comparisons would be relevant.   
	   27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Thomas Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism.’ in Sen, A and Williams, B, eds. Utilitarianism 
and Beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp.103-127. 
33 Frances Kamm, ‘Should You Save This Child? Gibbard on Intuitions, Contractualism, and Strains of 
Commitment.’, in Gibbard, A, ed. Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 121-128. P.133. 
34 Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 2014, op. cit. Similar arguments are presented in Otsuka and Voorhoeve 
2009, op. cit., and Otuska, 2012, op. cit.  
35  Johann Frick, ‘Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person: Response to Fleurbaey and 
Voorhoeve.’, in Eyal, N, Hurst, S, Norheim, O, and Wikler, D, eds. Inequalities in Health: Concepts, 
Measures, and Ethics. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp.130-146.   
36 See Rose, 2008, op. cit., and John, 2011, op. cit. 
37 Also excluded would be cases where the population strategy is intended to stop one individual 
imposing risks on others, such as a ban on cell phone use when driving. 
38 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example. 
39 See Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, op. cit., p.179. 
40 J. Paul Kelleher, ‘Prevention, Rescue and Tiny Risk.’ Public Health Ethics, 6,3 (2014): 252-261. 
41 John, 2014, op. cit. 
42 I would like to thank Clare Chambers, Ben Ferguson, Stephen John, Marco Meyer, and Alex 
Voorhoeve for helpful discussions and comments. 
